The University of Colorado at Boulder Law School

Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty
Scott Moss

University of Colorado Law School
451 Wolf Law Building
401 UCB
Boulder, CO  80309-0401
Phone: (303) 735-5374
E-mail: scott.moss@colorado.edu
Personal Link: http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pageID=1775

Curriculum Vitae:  View (PDF format)

Bio:
Scott Moss joined CU Law School in 2007 after six years as an attorney in New York City and three years as a professor at Marquette Law School, where he was the 2007 recipient of the James D. Ghiardi Faculty Award for Outstanding Teaching, Student Body Support, and Scholarship. In New York, Professor Moss was a law clerk to U.S. District Judge Constance Baker Motley and then a plaintiff's employment lawyer at Outten & Golden LLP, the largest plaintiff-side employment law practice in the country, where he litigated individual and class action cases of discrimination, harassment, and minimum/overtime wage violations. He also has argued and briefed appeals of employment cases and has undertaken pro bono projects such as First Amendment right-to-protest litigation with the New York Civil Liberties Union, low-income worker clinics in lower Manhattan, and court-sponsored mediations for pro se litigants. Professor Moss received his J.D. (magna cum laude) in 1998 from Harvard Law School, where he was a Senior Editor of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review; his B.A. (Economics) and M.A. (Media Studies) are from Stanford University. Professor Moss's research interests have included employment law, discrimination, constitutional law, various civil procedure rules, and economic analysis of all of the preceding topics.

Articles

Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 Duke L.J. 889 (2009).

The Intriguing Federalist Future of Reproductive Rights, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 175 (with Douglas M. Raines) (2008).

Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 867 (2007).

Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My!: A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1635 (Symposium: Constitutional “Niches”: The Role of Institutional Context in Constitutional Law). (2007). First Amendment free speech doctrine has been called institutionally oblivious for ignoring how different institutions present different legal questions. But with certain institutions, the situation is the opposite: extreme institutional tailoring of speech doctrine. The burden of proof ordinarily is on government to justify speech restrictions, but in three institutions – public schools, workplaces, and prisons – courts allow heavy speech restrictions and defer to government officials. Even if these institutions need to restrict speech unusually often, why do we need different, unusually government-deferential doctrine to so recognize? abstract

Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 981 (2007).

Against "Academic Deference": Keeping Title VII Alive to Redress Academic Discrimination, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2006).

Where There’s At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. Pittsburgh L. Rev. 295 (2005).

Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with Disturbing Implications for Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 Harv. Women’s L. J. 1 (2004).

An Overview of Disparate Impact Litigation, Annual Civil Rights Training Institute of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (2004).

Courses: