University of Colorado Law Review

Volume 71 Issue 3, Summer 2000

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic. A.B., University of Illinois; J.D., University of Illinois. Mark J. Loewenstein is a Professor of Law and the Charles Inglis Thomson Fellow at the University of Colorado, where he teaches courses in corporations, securities law, and contracts. Following his graduation from law school, Professor Loewenstein practiced with the Chicago law firm of Altheimer & Gray, specializing in corporate, securities and real estate matters. He joined the faculty of the University of Colorado School of Law in 1979 as a Visiting Associate Professor of Law, and he served as Associate Dean of Academic Affairs from 1986 to 1995. Professor Loewenstein was a French Government Fellow at the Université de Caen, in Caen, France, during the 1972-73 academic year, and a Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan during the 1990-91 academic year. He was a visiting professor at the University of Michigan School of Law during the Fall 1999 term.

GREGORY E. MAGGS, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code. A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard University. Professor Maggs is an Associate Professor of Law at George Washington University Law School, where he teaches Commercial Paper, Constitutional Law, and Contracts. Prior to teaching, Professor Maggs clerked for Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Anthony M. Kennedy, as well as for Judge Joseph T. Sneed of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Professor Maggs also worked with Judge Robert H. Bork at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. Professor Maggs has authored numerous articles dealing with issues relevant to Commercial Law and has authored several papers in the areas of Administrative Law, Legislation, and Constitutional Law. He also serves as an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

GARY MINDA, Globalization of Culture. B.A., Michigan State University; J.D., M.A., Wayne State University. Professor Minda is currently a Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law, and a Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School. He is author of numerous scholarly works, including Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's End, and Boycott in America: How Imagination and Ideology Shape the Legal Mind.

H. JEFFERSON POWELL, Convenient Shorthand: The Supreme Court and the Language of State Sovereignty. B.A., St. David's University College, University of Wales; A.M., Duke University; M.Div., Yale Divinity School; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Duke University. H. Jefferson Powell is a Professor of Law at Duke University, where he teaches in the areas of contracts and constitutional law. Professor Powell has served in both the federal and state governments, as a deputy assistant attorney general and as Principal Deputy Solicitor General in the United States Department of Justice, and as special counsel to the Attorney General of North Carolina. He has briefed and argued cases in both federal and state courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States. He is currently a consultant to the Justice Department on constitutional issues and to private clients on legal ethics matters. His publications include Languages of Power, The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism, and The Constitution and the Attorneys General, as well as numerous book chapters and scholarly articles.

BENJAMIN J. PRIESTER, Convenient Shorthand: The Supreme Court and the Language of State Sovereignty. A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Duke University. Benjamin J. Priester currently serves as a law clerk to the Honorable Susan H. Black of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Mr. Priester's publications include The Independent Counsel Statute: A Legal History and Sentenced for a "Crime" the Government did not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather than Elements of the Offense.